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Part I of this paper develops a model of economic response to inflation. 
Sections A, B, and C consider the maximizing behavior of employers and 
employees in the context  of  a steady rate of inflation. Since the rate of 
price change can be translated into an effective cost of holding money, a 
higher rate provides increased incentive for economizing on cash balances. 
Two methods of economizing are considered: first, (Sections A and B), 
reductions of the time interval between various types of payments (increases 
in  "velocity")  and,  second  (Section  C),  decreases in  the  fraction  of 
"monetized" transactions. 
With a given fraction of  monetized transactions, the selection  of the 
optimal  length  of  time  between  (wage  and  other  types  of)  payments 
involves a tradeoff of the inventory type. Given some fixed (real) cost of 
making payments, a  higher rate of  price change  reduces the  optimal- 
payment  interval  (increases  velocity)  and  produces  a  corresponding 
reduction in average real money holdings. 
The demand-for-money function which is implied by optimal-payments 
period selection approaches an inflation-rate elasticity of  -  1/2 as the rate 
of inflation becomes large (relative to real rates of return in the economy). 
However, this formulation assumes that the fraction of monetized trans- 
actions is unaffected by changes in the inflation rate. In fact, "money" 
may be viewed as a medium which provides certain transactions benefits 
(in  terms  of  physical  convenience,  general acceptability, et  cetera)  in 
comparison with alternative media. At a higher rate of price change, the 
cost  of retaining money as a payments medium is increased (relative to 
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that for stable-valued substitutes, such as payments in kind or foreign 
exchange).  If  this  inflationary cost  is  weighed  against  money's  trans- 
actions benefits, the fraction of expenditures for which it pays to retain 
money is inversely related to the rate of price change. The combination 
of  this  money-substitute  effect  with  the  previously  described velocity 
mechanism produces an increasing (absolute) elasticity of money demand 
to the rate of inflation. 
The analysis of Sections A, B, and C assumes a constant rate of price 
change. Section D extends the analysis to consider the optimal response 
to rates of inflation which vary over time. Basically, if no costs of adjust- 
ment or lags in perception are involved, the steady-state solution would be 
optimal at all times. Accordingly, if lags in perception are neglected, the 
optimal response to  changing rates of  inflation involves  a weighing of 
adjustment costs  (for example, costs  of instituting changes in the pay- 
ments period) against "out-of-equilibrium"  costs  (that is,  costs  of  not 
adhering to the steady-state rules at all times). The model of Section  D 
assumes that actual rates of price change are generated by a symmetric, 
stochastic process (a random walk), and that individuals adopt an adjust- 
ment policy of the (S, s) inventory form. According to this type of policy, 
variations in the inflation rate produce no response (in, say, the payments 
period or the fraction of monetized transactions) until some critical gap 
between actual and statically optimal levels appears. At this point some 
discrete adjustment of decision variables is performed in accordance with 
the optimal steady-state relationships. No  subsequent adjustments occur 
until a new gap of the critical size appears, 
The (S, s) response model is used to obtain an aggregate mechanism for 
generating "effective" rates of inflation (the rate which is relevant for key 
decision variables, and, therefore, for demand for money).  The mecha- 
nism is similar in form to earlier models of the adaptive-expectations type 
(Cagan 1956), although the current model reflects solely an adjustment lag. 
A key implication of  maximizing behavior is the dependence of  the re- 
sponse coefficient on the (effective) rate of inflation itself. 
The theory of Part I is applied in Part II to an empirical study of demand 
for money. The data derive from four cases of post-World  War I hyper- 
inflation (Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland), which were previously 
studied by Cagan (1956) and Allais (1966). Substantial space is devoted to 
constructing null hypotheses which embody the theoretical implications of 
Part I. Basically, these null hypotheses involve a priori conjectures on the 
coefficients of  regression equations. The (nonlinear, iterative) empirical 
estimation and testing confirms the bulk of these conjectures, and, there- 
fore, provides support for the underlying theory. Comments on the statis- 
tical results and avenues for future research are indicated at the end of the 
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1.  A Model of the Payments Period and the Demand for Money 
A.  The Basic Steady-State Model 
The model is developed with reference to a business firm, which is sub- 
sequently viewed as an employer. Assume that prices in an economy are 
rising uniformly at a continuous rate, rp, so that: 
P(t)  =  Poervt,  (1) 
where, PO  is the price level at time zero. 
A firm (for example, a store) is receiving a continuously rising stream 
of money income given by: 
Y(t)=  Yoerpt,  (2) 
where, YO  is the income level at time zero. 
Money income is assumed to be rising at the same rate, rp, as prices, 
so  that real income  is  constant.  The  firm's alternative to  retaining its 
income flow as cash (which is depreciating in value at the rate of inflation, 
rp) is to hold some alternative stable-valued asset, such as physical com- 
modities or foreign exchange (it is assumed for simplicity that real interest 
bearing assets are unavailable). However, there is  some cost  or bother 
associated with the conversion of cash into a stable-valued asset, so that 
transfers are not made continuously. That is, the firm accumulates money 
over a period and converts a lump amount to an alternative asset at some 
transfer date. The nature of the relevant transfer cost is complex, since it 
may involve personal bother or waste of time, wage payments to employees, 
actual brokerage charges for foreign exchange or other financial trans- 
actions, et cetera. In general the cost involves some elements which are 
related to  the  price level  and  others which  are of  an  income-forgone 
nature.' However, when prices and income grow at the same rate, it is 
expected that the money value of the transfer cost also grows at this rate. 
Accordingly,  if  a(t)  represents the  money  cost  of  transfers at  time  t 
(regarded for simplicity as being independent of the amount transferred), 
we have: 
a(t)  =  aoerpt,  (3) 
where ao is the money cost at time zero. 
The presence of interest and transfer-cost elements produces a tradeoff 
which  amounts  to  an  optimization  problem  for  the  firm.  A  general 
formulation of the problem is the following:  Given that a transfer from 
cash to stable asset was made at some time to, choose the future transfer 
1 That is, a substantial element in transfer activity is the expenditure  of a certain 
amount of time, so that transactions  productivity  may not grow, even if overall real 
per capita income is rising. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  I231 
dates, t1,  t2,  .  . . so  as to achieve an optimal tradeoff between the interest 
cost of holding cash and the transfer cost of making more frequent asset 
conversions. 
Mathematically, the  optimization -is as follows:  After the transfer at 
time to, consider the interval (to, t1) where t1 is the first optional transfer 
date. In a time differential, dt, the increment to money holding is given by 
dM =  Ydt =  Yoerptdt.  Therefore, the addition to interest cost (in terms 
of "t1-money") is given by: 
dZ =  dM[erp(tl -t)-  1] =  yoerpt[erp(ti  t)  -  I]dt. 
The total interest cost (in " t1-money  ") for the interval (to, t1), is then: 
rti 
Z(to, t1) =  Yo  erPt[erp(ti  -t)  -  1]dt 
=  Yo  [erpti (ti -  to)  -  -  (erpt,  -  rpto)] 
Since the employer's opportunity-cost rate is equal to rp, this cost can be 
expressed as  "time-zero  money"  by  discounting  by  the  factor,  e-rptl. 
Denoting this discounted amount (to time zero) as Z*, we have: 
Z*(to, t1) =  Yoti-  to- 
I 
[1  -erPfto  l]-j  (4) 
Similarly, for any interval (tk, tk +  1),  the result is: 
Z*(tk,  tk+1)  =  YO{tk  + I  -  tk  - 
I 
[1  -  erp(tk  tk  + 1]}.  (5) 
The total interest cost up to the nth transfer date, tn, is the sum of n terms 
of the form of equation (5), so that: 
Z*(to,  tn)  =  Yo  tn  -  to  - 
I 
[n -  erp(to-t1_  erP(tn  -W 
(6) 
The  nominal  amount  of  transfer cost  for  any  interval,  (tk,  tk + 1),  is 
aoerptk  +  1  so that the discounted cost is ao. Therefore, the total discounted 
transfer cost for the interval, (to, t),  is given by: 
A*(to, tn)  =  aon.  (7) 
The total discounted cost, ZT,  for the interval (to,  tn),  is given by the 
sum of equations (6) and (7): 
T=  Yo{t,  -  to  -0 
I 
rPtto  ti)  er  (  tn)]}  +  aon. 
(8) 
The optimization problem can be formulated as follows. Given a time I232  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
interval, T=  t,  -  to, with the constraint that the final transfer be made 
at time tn, choose n and t1, t2,..  .,  tn1  so that Z* is a minimum. A neces- 
sary condition for a  minimum  is  aZ*/t_-  0  for k =  1,...,  n-1. 
Therefore, Y,(-  erptk  -1  e- rptk  +  e-  rptk +1  erptk)  -  0. Rearranging  terms, we 
have e2rptk-  erp(tk  1-  + tk  )  Therefore: 
tk  2= 
I 
(tkl  +  tk+1)  fork  =  1,..n  -  1.  (9) 
In other words, the optimal transfer points are evenly spaced when prices, 
income, and transfer costs grow at the same rate.2 
The result in equation (9) implies that equation (8) can be simplified to: 
YoY[T-  -(1-  )  +  aon,  (10) 
where use has been made of the conditions (t  -  tk +)  =-  Tn,  and 
(tn  -  to)  =  T. The minimization problem then reduces to choosing n, the 
number of transfers in time T, so that (10) is a minimum. Accordingly,3 
An -  (e-pT/n)  4 -1(1  2  erTn)]  +  ao  =  0.  cn  4  n  r, 
Therefore:  Yo  e-rpTmli  (1/rp  +  Tin) -  Yo/rp  +  a,  0.  Expanding  the 
exponential in a power series: 
Yo(I+  n)  {[(I)(  n )  ]/+  ao  0. 
Simplifying, we eventually obtain: 
y?  =  rp(T/na)2.  {[(-  1)i]/[(i  +  2)i!1 (rP  }  (11)  yo  p(Tln  \rpni 
2 If real income is not constant, a sufficient  condition for equally spaced transfers 
is that money income and transfer cost grow at the same rate. (This result is valid 
even if some nonzero real rate of discount is appropriate.  In this case the opportunity 
cost of holding money is r =  r* +  rp, where r* is the real rate of discount and r, 
is the rate of price change.) Stated somewhat differently,  as long as transfer  costs are 
completely of  an income-forgone nature, the optimal transfer points are equally 
spaced. 
3  At first sight, the treatment  of n (number  of transfers  in time T) as a continuous 
variable is suspect. However, the selection of n in this manner amounts to a choice 
of  Tin  (time between payments), which can properly be regarded as continuous. 
The optimization runs into some trouble if T is retained  as a finite horizon (amount- 
ing to the constraint that an integral number of transfers  must occur in a specified 
length of time, such as a week or a month), in which case the calculus solution must 
be regarded as an approximation. However, the nature of  the objective function 
guarantees  that the true optimum will be close, in the sense that an integer adjacent 
to the calculus result will be the optimal value. (That is, the second derivative  of the 
cost expression in equation [10]  is  (02ZT)/(1n2)  =  Ye-rPTIn  (r,/n)(T/n)2,  which is 
positive when r, is positive. Therefore, the objective function is "single troughed," 
and an integer adjacent to the calculus solution is the optimal value.) INFLATION AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1233 
If r,(T/n) << 1, we may approximate a/  Yo  {r,(T/n)2.  Therefore: 
T  V1(2a0)/(rpYo).  (12)  n 
Corresponding to this solution, rT/n  =  V1(2aor,)/  YO,  which will be much 
less than 1 for conceivable values of a,, rp,  and YO,  so that the exponential 
approximation is appropriate. The second-order condition  is also  satis- 
fied, so that the solution of equation (12) corresponds to a minimum for 
7* . 
Applying  the  exponential  approximation,  epTn  r  1 -rET/n  +  2 
(rpT/n)2,  directly to equation (10), we obtain for later use an expression 
(dependent on T/n) for total (discounted) employer cost over time T: 
Zemployer  2 rY,(Tln)T  +  (a01P0)  n.  (13) 
The first term in this expression amounts to the interest cost over time 
T on the employer's average money balance: 
(M/P) employer  2 P  -  2 P _.  (14) 
Therefore, the determination of T/n in equation (12) implies an employer 
average money demand in the form of equation (14). Since the solution 
for T/n in equation (12) is modified by a consideration of employee be- 
havior, this implied demand-for-money function is not discussed at this 
point. 
B.  The Payments Period 
Equation  (12)  indicates  the  optimal  time  spacing  for  conversions  of 
employer cash holdings to alternative stable-valued assets, such as com- 
modities  and  foreign  exchange,  on  the  assumption  that  these  assets 
represent an ultimate destination for employer funds. In fact, a substantial 
fraction of employer income is destined for wage payments to employees 
(or other types of payments), so that the indirect route, cash to stable asset 
(to cash) to payments, may be nonoptimal. That is, if wage payments (or 
other payments) are regarded by the employer as fixed in real terms, the 
rendering of these payments is (from the employer standpoint) equivalent 
to the transfer of cash to a stable-valued asset. In other words, if a(t) in 
equation (3) is reinterpreted as the cost of making wage payments, and if 
the rendering of these payments is substituted for the conversion of cash 
to a stable-valued asset, then the model will (with the qualifications noted 
below) describe the determination of the payments period during inflation. 1234  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
From the employer standpoint, the interpretation of the time interval 
of  equation (12) as a payments period assumes that the indirect route, 
cash to  stable asset to payments, will not be used. Whether, in fact, an 
asset would be considered for this type of intermediate function depends 
on the cost of moving in and out of the asset, and the real rate of return 
that accrues on it. In particular, an asset will be used only if the transfer 
cost is small relative to the cost of making wage payments, and/or the real 
rate of return is substantial. One possible type of satisfactory asset is a 
stable-valued (or real interest bearing) deposit or short-term bill. 
At  least during extreme inflationary experiences, the available assets 
do  not  conform  well  to  the  conditions  suggested above.4 Rather, the 
available assets appear to serve two other types of functions. First, there 
are assets whose transactions-cost and return characteristics make them 
suitable as a long-term store of wealth, but not as a temporary abode for 
funds earmarked for payments over the relatively short term.5 This class 
includes real investment opportunities, accumulation of types of physical 
commodities, and so forth. 
The second category consists of assets which themselves acquire means- 
of-payments properties during extreme inflation. When a sufficiently high 
rate of inflation is attained, it becomes worthwhile to use certain substitute 
transactions media (such as foreign exchange, private tokens, and certain 
commodities) in order to avoid the costs associated with the use of the 
depreciating  currency.  However,  while  the  existence  of  such  money 
substitutes has a substantial impact on the demand for money, the effect 
does not operate via the intermediary mechanism described above. That 
is, as long as the usual money supply is retained for receipts and payments, 
these types of assets do not enter the analysis.6 A discussion of these assets 
as substitute means of payments is contained in Section C below. For the 
remainder of  this section, it is assumed that  the usual money supply is 
retained for  all  transactions purposes,  and  that  no  satisfactory inter- 
mediate assets exist.7 
A more serious qualification to the interpretation of equation (12) as a 
I  In  a  complete  model,  the  types  of  available  assets  would  themselves  be endog- 
enous.  However,  the  absence  of  "short-term,"  real  interest  bearing  assets  during 
extreme  inflations  seems  to  reflect the  uncertainty  of  the  inflationary  course,  rather 
than  the intensity,  per se. Since the introduction  of uncertainty  does  not seem critical 
for  the prime areas of  interest  of  the steady-state  model,  it seems  desirable  to  main- 
tain  the  assumption  of  certainty  and  to  regard the types  of  available  assets  as exog- 
enous. 
5  It is assumed  implicitly  that  the payments  period  will not  exceed  some  relatively 
short  time  interval.  This  constraint  derives  from  the  employee  behavior  (discussed 
below),  which  serves to  make  an overly  long  period  unprofitable  to  the employer. 
6  Essentially,  if  these  assets  could  serve  as  a  profitable  intermediate  asset,  they 
could  more  profitably  serve as a complete  means-of-payments  substitute. 
7  The  impact  of  stable-valued,  readily  accessible  intermediate  assets  is  discussed 
below  in n.  17. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1235 
payments period involves the behavior of employees. The original pre- 
sentation of the model (with the substitution of wage payments for trans- 
fers to stable-valued assets) tacitly assumes that employees are indifferent 
to  the length of the payments period, and are concerned only with the 
(apparent) real wage rate. In fact, increases in the period impose certain 
costs  on employees, which must be weighed in determining the optimal 
length of time between payments.8 
The first type of employee cost derives from the delay in real payment 
implied by a lengthened payments period.9 The second cost involves the 
relationship between the payments period and average employee money 
holdings. 
The cost imputed to delayed real wage payment depends on the use of 
these  payments.  If  delayed  payment  implies  a  reduction  in  employee 
savings, the (real) lending rate is relevant. If the delay results in increased 
borrowings,  the  (real)  borrowing rate  is  appropriate. In  many  cases 
(particularly during extreme inflation, when financial markets are highly 
imperfect) neither borrowing nor lending is involved, and the impact is 
directly on postponed consumption.10 That is, if (real) lending rates are 
low and (real) borrowing rates are high, an intermediate marginal impa- 
tience rate is most likely to  apply. In any case, there exists some (real) 
rate r* (not necessarily identical for all individuals)1  at which payment 
delays are discounted.12 
8 See  Friedman  1956, p.  13. 
It  is  assumed that wage payments are made subsequent to  the rendering of 
services. This assumption is discussed below in n. 12. 
10  Behavior in markets where borrowing and lending rates differ is discussed in 
Hirshleifer 1958. 
11  The discount rate may not be independent  of TIn (delays need not be discounted 
linearly), but this complication is neglected here. 
12  The question of  advanced versus deferred wage payments (see n.  9) can be 
treated as follows. Let rB denote the real employee borrowing  rate (and also the rate 
at which employers are willing to lend to employees); r* the marginal impatience 
rate of employees (which is assumed to equal the rate at which employees are willing 
to lend to employers-that  is, lending to employers  is viewed as a riskless investment 
by employees); and rL  the real rate of return (or riskless lending rate) on employer 
(and employee) wealth holdings, where rB  ?  r* >  rL. It is assumed that the employer 
borrowing  rate  (and, therefore,  also the employer  marginal  impatience  rate) is approx- 
imately equal to  rL,  so that /'L  unambiguously  represents  the marginal  rate of return 
on employer  funds. Therefore,  in this view the essential  distinction  between  employees 
and employers is the relative position of borrowing  rates. 
Assume that the (real) amount X/P  is paid from employers to employees at some 
nonzero payment interval. An advance of wages amounts to a loan (of the average 
quantity, [1/2]1[X/P]),  from employers to employees while a deferral implies a loan 
in the opposite direction. An advance (employer to employee loan) is valued by 
employers at the rate -  B,  and by employees at the rate r*.  The net (nonpositive) 
rate of return  associated with advance payment is therefore -  B  +  r*. Similarly,  the 
rate of return on deferrals (employee to employer loans) is  -r*  +  rL.  Therefore, 
advances and deferrals  both involve nonpositive rates of return in comparison with 
the zero rate of return  attached to perfect synchronization  of  payments  (abstracting 
from transactions  costs). Given that payments are not to be perfectly synchronized 1236  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
If the nominal wage rate is denoted by w, the amount of nominal wage 
payment (for a period, T/n) is given by X =  avi(T/n).13  Consider the interval 
between the payments points, to and t1. At t1, employees receive a quantity 
of real wage payment, X/P =  w/P(T/n), in payment for services between 
to and t1. Assuming that employees conduct expenditures at a uniform rate 
and just exhaust a single wage payment over the time interval, Tln, the 
average deferred time between wage accruals and employee expenditure 
is  Tin. The  cost  of  this  delay  for  a  single  payments period  (ignoring 
compounding during the  short interval, T/n)'4 is r*(X/P)T/n =  r*(w/P) 
(T/n)2. The cost for n periods (that is, for a time T) is therefore: 
Zr* =  r*(w/P)(T/n)T.  (15) 
The average employee real money balance (assuming the absence of 
intermediate assets) can be approximated by: 
1/  IX  1w  (l6) 
M/P  y2  P  2  2-(T/n)  (16) 
The corresponding employee interest cost (that is, the inflationary loss on 
money holdings, neglecting compounding, over the time T) is given by: 
Zr  (M/P) rpT  hr  T(  (17) 
The total employee cost for time T (the sum of expressions [15] and [17]) 
is therefore: 
Z employee = 
I 
-T(r,  +  2r*).  (18) 
Expression (18), above, may overstate employee costs, since it excludes 
any deviation of expenditures from a uniform flow. In fact, as inflation 
intensifies,  employees  are  (ceteris paribus)  motivated  to  concentrate 
(because of transactions costs), the optimal payments scheme is the one with the 
least negative rate of return. (As in the rest of the analysis, concern is only with 
obtaining a "Pareto-optimal type" solution, and is not with the division of costs 
and benefits  between employers  and employees. See n. 15 below.) Therefore,  deferred 
payment  is preferred  to  advanced payment  if  and only  if:  (r*  --  rL)  <  (rB  -  r*).  (It 
should be noted that, at least as long as r* is independent of the length of delays, 
any intermediate  payments solution corresponds to a weighted average of the two 
extreme rates of return, and is therefore inferior to one of the extreme solutions, 
unless these are themselves  equivalent.) Since the model assumes that payments are 
deferred, the appropriate  (real) discount  rate for payments  delays is (r*  -  rL);  (rL  =  0 
has also been assumed). In general  the discount  rate  can be written  as: min [(rB  -r*); 
(r*  -  rL)]. 
13  It is assumed that employment-numbers  of  man-hours worked per week- 
does not change. In this case, Tln is an acceptable  proxy for total man-hours  worked. 
14  This and subsequent approximations which ignore compounding are formally 
equivalent  to the infinite series approximation  involved in the derivation  of equation 
(12). The validity of the approximation  depends throughout on (rQ  +  r*)(Tln) <<  1. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1237 
expenditures closer to payment times in order to reduce money holdings 
and incur smaller losses from inflation. However, a preliminary model of 
this behavior suggests that the general relationship between average money 
holdings and the rate of inflation is not materially altered by a considera- 
tion of this motive. This conclusion is further supported by the observation 
that,  while  employees  desire to  concentrate expenditures shortly after 
wage  payments,  employers  have  a  symmetric  desire  to  concentrate 
expenditures just before payments. The balancing of these forces could 
generate a  "weekly  seasonal"  of  rate of  price change that  would  dis- 
courage the concentration of expenditures either just after or just before 
wage payments, and tend to restore the system to  a uniform pattern of 
expenditure. In any case, the assumption of uniform patterns is retained in 
the body of this paper. 
With the assumption of uniform expenditure streams, total real costs 
over time T (the sum of  employer and employee costs) are given (from 
equations [13] and [18]) by: 
Ztotal  T{[ (2  +  -  )rp +  r*]  +  T}  (19) 
The optimal-payments period is that value of  Tln which minimizes this 
total  cost  expression.15  Accordingly,  we  have:  aZ/a(T/n)  =  T[! (YIP 
+  w/p)rp  +  w/p r* -(a/p)/(T/n)2]  =  0. Therefore: 
7' =  Jl(alP)/[2  (  +  )rrp +  ?  ]r*  (20) 
If we assume w1P  Y/P,16  we can write:17 
-  V1(a/P)/[Y/P(r, +  r*)].  (21)  n 
The second-order minimum condition is satisfied for this solution. 
15  This cost minimization guarantees a Pareto-optimal situation with respect to 
employers and employees. For example, if  employees were willing to  pay some 
amount (in the form, say, of a reduced  explicit wage) for a reduction in the payments 
period, and employers were willing to accept some lesser amount as compensation 
for this reduction,  it is assumed  that the reduction  of the payments  period takes place. 
The division of costs and benefits  between employers  and employees is not discussed 
explicitly-largely  because it does not seem necessary  for the desired results. 
16  In effect, Y corresponds to the total money flow into a business and w to the 
total money flow out of a business. (That is, w comprises rentals, payments to other 
businesses, net earnings, et cetera, as well as payments to labor-although  the real 
discount rate, r*, may depend on the particular  form of payment.) Therefore,  syste- 
matic deviations between YIP  and w1P  can occur only through intermediate  inflation- 
ary losses. This loss relates to the cost of inflation (equations [19] and [22]) and 
increases  with (r, +  r*)l/2.  However, as long as r, is less than astronomical,  this cost 
remains small relative to  YIP, so that the approximation YIP -  wlp should be sus- 
tainable. 
17  The payments-period  relationship,  equation (21), can be readily extended to the 
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TABLE  1 
RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  PAYMENTS  PERIOD 
AND  RATE  OF  INFLATION* 
rp (% per Month)  Tln (Months) 
0 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5  (2 per month) 
1 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .35  (3 per month) 
3 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .25  (1 per week) 
15 .  .  .125  (2 per week) 
50 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .07 (every 2 days) 
200  .  035 (daily) 
* As implied by equation (21). 
While it is possible to discuss only orders of magnitude, it is interesting 
to explore the relationship between the payments period and the rate of 
inflation implied by equation (21). For example, taking parameter values 
of  Y =  $400 per month, a =  $1.00 (only the ratio a! Y is of importance in 
equation  [21]), and  r* =  .01 per month,  the  relationship as  shown  in 
table 1 holds. 
While the exact relationship depends on the arbitrary specification of 
parameters, the overall magnitudes accord with observations from some 
extreme inflationary experiences.18  An interesting implication of the above 
plausible situation, employers have available (at a transfer  cost which, in the overall 
cost calculation, is low enough to make the asset worthwhile) an alternative asset 
with (riskless) real rate of return, rL, and employees have available no satisfactory 
alternative  asset. In this case the real rate of return on employer money holdings is 
changed from -  r, to rL, and the remainder  of the model is unchanged. Therefore, 
(r,  +  r*)  in equation (21) is replaced by (r*  -r  -  -rL) to  yield the new optimal 
payments period. If employees have access to a similar satisfactory asset, (r,  +  r*) 
in equation (21) is replaced by (r* -rL).  In this case, the determination  of a finite 
payments period requires the real discount rate of  employees (r*) to  exceed the 
underlying  (riskless)  real rate of return  (rL). 
It should be noted that the decision to employ an alternative asset involves a 
weighing of the rate of return  against the cost of transactions  relative to the volume 
of transactions. Therefore, considering their larger scale of transactions, employers 
are more likely than employees to find a particular  asset (with given rate of return 
and transactions-cost  characteristics)  satisfactory, so that the first case (with rate: 
r*  +  Ir,  -  IrL) may  be the  most  realistic-at  least  for  developed  countries  like  the 
United States. For countries that are experiencing  extreme inflations (such as those 
studied in Part II of this paper) the complete exclusion of intermediate  assets seems 
most realistic, and equation (21) applies directly. 
18  For example, in 1923, the final year of the German hyperinflation,  "it became 
the custom to make an advance  of wages on Tuesday  the balance  being paid on Friday. 
Later, some firms used to pay wages three times a week, or even daily" (Bresciani- 
Turroni 1937, p. 303). The range of ("effective") rates of inflation in this period was 
20-300 percent per month (see table A2). Similarly,  during the Austrian  hyperinfla- 
tion, "the salaries of the state officials, which used to  be issued at the end of the 
month, were paid to them during 1922 in instalments  three  times per month" (Walre 
de Bordes 1924, p. 163). During 1922 the (effective)  rate of inflation reached a peak 
value of about 45 percent per month (see table Al). INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  I239 
relationship  is  the  comparatively  minor  adjustment in  the  payments 
period necessitated by astronomical rates of inflation. Even at the extraor- 
dinary rate of 200 percent per month, payments are made only once per 
day.  While this  high frequency of  payment involves  additional  bother 
(amounting to one-half of the inflationary cost of equation [22]), it cannot 
be viewed as an intolerable burden. Therefore, it is not  surprising that 
(depending on  the  types  of  substitute payments  media  available) the 
benefits of money as a transactions medium could outweigh the inflationary 
cost, and induce persons to retain money at rates of inflation (as high, say 
as  100-200 percent per month) at which casual analysis might suggest a 
total flight from money.19 
Substituting  the  result  of  equation  (21)  into  equation  (19),  using 
YIP  w/P, we  obtain an expression for total  (minimized) inflationary 
cost over time T:  20 
Ztotal  2TVa/P(Y/P)(r,  +  r*).  (22) 
C.  The Demand  for Money and Money Substitutes 
Using the approximation for employer money balances in equation (14) 
and the analogous expression for employees in equation (16), aggregate 
real balances can be expressed as: 
M/P=  M/Pempioyers  +  M/Pemployees 
l YT  lwT 
-2P  +  77  (23)  2 P  n  2  2P  n-(3 
Taking Y/P  h?/P and substituting for T/n from equation (21), we obtain 
(omitting the bar over M/P): 
M/P  /(a/P)(Y/P)  (24)  M 
(r  +~  r*) 
(4 
If transfer costs (a/P) are totally of an income-forgone nature (a/P 
Y/P), then: 
/P  AY/P 
_Vrp  +  r* 
where A =  V/(a/P)/( Y/P) is taken as a positive constant. 
In the analysis of  Sections A and B,  money was retained as the sole 
payments  medium.  Within this  framework, there  emerged an  inverse 
19 In this regard see Keynes  1924, pp. 48-50. 
20  The cost  due to the inflation  rate r, requires a subtraction  of the r* portion  from 
equation  (22): 
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relation between real cash balances and the inflation rate (equations [24] 
and [25]). The mechanism by which cash holdings were reduced in response 
to  a higher rate of  inflation involved the reduction of  the time  period 
between  transactions  (that  is,  an  increase in  velocity).  An  additional 
mechanism by which cash holdings could be reduced involves the sub- 
stitution  of  some  alternative  asset  (foreign  exchange,  private  tokens, 
payments in kind, and so on) as a transactions medium. By reducing the 
set of transactions to which money is applied, average cash holdings can 
be reduced, even if transaction periods (velocity) remain constant. 
Letting 5P(r,)  denote the fraction of transactions (as a function of the 
inflation rate) which  are conducted  via  some  substitute medium,  and 
assuming that the analysis of Sections A and B applies to the 100(1 -) 
percent of transactions for which money is retained, we have from equation 
(25): 
M/~ [1 
- 
P(r,)]  -A YIP  (6 
/Vrp +  r*  (26) 
The elasticity of  real cash balances with respect to  the inflation rate is 
(from equation [26]): 
cr(M/P)  rp  (  rp 
-  rp V(rp) 
arP  MIP  2  rp +  r*)  I -  (rp) 
Therefore, if the percentage of monetized transactions does not respond 
to rp[(D'(rp)  =  0,  P(rp) <  1], the elasticity is given by the first term on the 
right-hand side of equation (27). In this form (with r* >  0), the (absolute) 
elasticity rises from zero at rp =0  and asymptotically approaches I  as 
rp becomes large relative to r*. On the other hand, if the percentage of 
substitutes responds positively to  the rate of inflation  ['F'(rp)  >  0],  the 
right-hand term in equation (27) adds (possibly in an increasing fashion) 
to  the  (absolute)  elasticity.  Stated  another  way,  if  the  percentage of 
money substitutes is constrained to be unresponsive to the inflation rate 
(and, therefore, if increases in velocity are the only method for reducing 
real money holdings),21 there would exist a limiting elasticity of real cash 
balances to  the inflation rate. When the possibility of varying the per- 
centage of monetized transactions is recognized, there exists the potential 
for an indefinitely increasing elasticity. 
Once the percentage of monetized transactions (1 -  $)  is regarded as 
a  behaviorally determined magnitude,  it  is  necessary to  construct  an 
explicit cost-benefit framework for determining the mode which payments 
take.  If  money  is  used for  a  volume  of  transactions corresponding to 
21 It should be recalled that variations in the shape of expenditure streams have 
been ruled out. However,  this type of variation  does not appear  to be a potential  source 
of an increasing  inflation-rate  elasticity. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  124I 
YIP, the inflationary cost per unit of time is  (from equation [22], using 
A =  -V[a1P]1[Y1P]): 
T  =  2A(Y/P)(  Mr+r*  -  )  (28) 
If  a  stable-valued asset  is  substituted as  the  transactions medium,  the 
above cost could be avoided. Therefore, the decision to  employ money 
or the substitute involves a comparison of the inflationary cost (equation 
[28]) with the benefits of money as a transactions medium (in terms of 
physical convenience,  general acceptability, et  cetera). The  size of  this 
benefit cannot  be  readily  quantified, since  it  depends  on  the  type  of 
transaction  and  the  individuals  involved.  For  example,  the  benefit is 
likely to increase as one moves along the following list: (1) transactions 
within a family, (2) regular dealings with a local merchant, (3) dealings in 
new locations, (4) payments by mail, (5) dealings in securities markets. 
In  any case,  it  seems feasible to  group transactions into homogeneous 
classes, within which the benefit per amount of transaction is constant. 
That is, for the ith group of transactions, the benefit (per unit of time) of 
employing money is: 
Bi  (T/P)(l  -  P'i)(  Y/P)L,  (29) 
where, (1 -  (Di) is the fraction of the ith group's transactions which use 
money; and (T/P)i  is a constant for the ith group. The net benefit from 
employing money (over the stable-valued substitute) is (from equations 
[29] and [28]): 
Ri =  (1 -  (FP)(YIP)i[(F/P)i  -2A(VriTV*  -  Vr*)].  (30) 
If the expression in brackets is positive, it will be advantageous to employ 
money for all transactions of the ith group ((Di  =  0), while if the bracket 
expression is  negative,  the  ith  group  should  abandon  money  entirely 
(@i =  1). Therefore, the criterion for employing substitutes for the entire 
volume of transactions corresponding to (YIP)i is: 
(Tf/P), <  2A(Vr,  +  r* -  /*).  (31) 
Given the group criterion of equation (31), and assuming that A, rp, and 
r* do not vary among different groups, the overall percentage of substitute 
transactions as a function of rp is determined by the joint distribution of 
(T/P)i  and (Y/P)i.  In the  absence of  direct empirical evidence  on  this 
distribution, an aggregate relation for  subsequent empirical analysis is 
derived  from  the  following  (semiheroic) assumptions:  (1)  (T/P)i  and 
(Y/P)i are independently distributed; (2) the distribution of (T/P)i satisfies 1242  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
certain  boundary conditions,22 and  can  be  adequately described by  a 
(second-order) gamma distribution (Hogg and Craig 1965, pp. 91-93): 
Pr[(T/P)i  <  x]  =  1 -(1  +  Ax)e-x  (x  > 0)  (32) 
Pr[(T/P)i  <  x]  =  0  (x  <  0) 
where, Pr may be interpreted as a cumulative probability. With the above 
assumptions, the overall percentage of substitute transactions is: 
q) =  Pr[(f/P)i  <  2A(Vr-  +  -r* -  V)].  (33) 
Letting  k  =  2AA, we  obtain  from  equation  (32):23 
qP =  1 -  [1  +  k(Vrp  +  r  -Alr  Ae  ITP  +r*-  /;)  (rP  >  0), 
(34) 
(D  =  ?  (rP < 0). 
Using equation (26) we obtain the demand-for-money function: 
/  =  A Y/P  *  (1  --/j;  M/P  Vr  I  +  r* [I  +  k(Vlrp  +  r* -  )]ek(rp+r-Vr)  (r  0), 
(35) 
M/P  =  Ar  (-Pr*  <  rp <  0)24 
V/rP +  r* 
In  equation  (32),  the  "expected  value"  of  (W7P)i is  (T/P)  =  2/A. 
Therefore, in equations (34) and (35), k =  4A/Q(/P)  is a parameter which 
is inversely related to the average cost  of employing money substitutes. 
The higher this average cost,  the smaller the percentage of money sub- 
stitutes (equation [34]), and the larger the demand for the conventional 
money supply (equation [35]) for a given value of rp.25 
The inflation-rate elasticity from equation [35] for large values of rp is: 
MrP  M/P  (  k  2r  ~~(M/P)  r 
-  I+  krP)  (rp>  ?r*).  (36) 
22  (l)  f(X)  =  0 for x  <  0 (see n. 24), (2)f(x)  is skewed  to the left for positive  values 
of x, (3) f(x)  is approximately  exponentially  declining  for large values  of x.  While the 
(second-order)  gamma  distribution  is  only  one  possible  distribution  that  satisfies 
these  properties,  some  others  which  might  be considered  (such  as,  log  normal)  have 
cumulative  distributions  which  cannot  be integrated  in closed  form. 
23  By adopting  the boundary  condition  (D(r, =  0)  =  0, we ignore  the  possible  use 
of  money  substitutes  when  r,  <  0.  Actually,  a  positive  rate  of  return  on  money 
holdings  (r,  <  0)  may  be  required  in  order  to  induce  certain  nonmonetary  sectors 
of  the  economy  (especially  prevalent  in  underdeveloped  countries)  to  employ  the 
conventional  money  supply. 
24  The situation  with  r,  <  r* is unstable  because  the  real rate of  return on  money 
holdings  (-r,)  exceeds  the  marginal  impatience  rate,  r*.  The  stability  properties  of 
the system  will be discussed  in a later paper. 
25  The  percentage  of  money-substitute  transactions,  as  a  function  of  the  rate  of 
inflation,  is illustrated  in  the table  below.  Parameter values  of k  =  1.25 (months  1/2) 
(the empirical  estimate  for Germany)  and  r*  =  .01 per month  have  been  used. INFLATION  AND  DEMAND  FOR  MONEY  1243 
Therefore, the (absolute) elasticity increases with r,  beyond  I,  with the 
rate of increase depending on k. While the precise form of equation (36) 
hinges on  the  assumed distributions of  (T/P)i  and  (Y/P)i,  the  general 
behavior depends only on an increasing tendency to adopt substitutes as 
rp rises, and has already been described in equation (27). 
In  equation  (35),  which  assumes  that  transactions  costs,  aIP,  rise 
proportionately with  Y/P, the elasticity of real cash balances with respect 
to real income is constant at  + 1.0. If transactions costs rise less than in 
proportion to  YIP, the elasticity is reduced and "economies-of-scale"  in 
cash balances are realized. If transactions costs  rise more than in pro- 
portion to  YIP, the elasticity exceeds + 1.0 and money is a "luxury."26 
D.  The "Effective" Rate of Inflation 
Equation (35) indicates the quantity of real money holdings, MIP, corre- 
sponding to a steady rate of inflation, rp. If the inflation rate varies over 
time,  equation  (35) does  not  carry over  directly, since  the  underlying 
optimization assumes that the single rate rp persists forever (or, at least, 
that all economic actors behave as though they believe in a constant rate). 
If the rate of inflation is not constant, we can define an effective rate of 
inflation,  rt,  as that "perpetual" rate which corresponds to the current 
(demand for) real balances in the form of equation (35). That is: 
(M/P)t  -  ?  r+  [I +  k(V\7rt +  r*-  Vr*)]  e  k(Vf  +r  -  -r)  (7  ?  0) 
(37) 
(MIp)D  AY/P  (-r*  <  ,e  <  0), 
V/7r + r* 
where, we maintain the assumption that  YIP and r* are fixed. 
rp  (%  per month)  'D(%7) 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ...  0 
1  .  0.2 
3  ......  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.8 
15  ......  .  .  .  .  .  .  5.5 
50  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18.0 
200  ......  .  .  .  .  .  .  49.2 
Therefore,  if the form  of  the  distribution  and  the estimated  k value  are accepted, 
money  substitutes  become  important  only  under  the  most  extreme  inflationary 
conditions. 
26  This result assumes  that changes  in  YIP do not,  ceteris paribus, produce  changes 
in  the  percentage  of  transactions  which  are  monetized.  One  might  argue  that  an 
increase  in  overall  real  income  (development)  is  associated  with  shifts  to  types  of 1244  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
If iT, denotes the actual rate of inflation, (l/P)(dP)/(dt),  at time  t,  the 
steady-state model suggests the boundary condition:  rt  =  rp  constant, 
for  t  =  -o,  +  ??  >  7T  =  rp,  where,  7Tt  at  future times may be inter- 
preted here as a fully expected (7Tt = rp  with probability 1) rate of inflation. 
In the general case we require behavioral assumptions that go beyond 
the steady-state model. 
The statement that (M/P)l  is related to 
,e  in the form of equation (37) 
amounts to the statement that  7te determines such fundamental decision 
variables as the payments period and the percentage of money substitutes 
in  a  manner which  leads  to  the  prescribed form for  money  demand. 
Accordingly, T/n (for those  transactions which retain the conventional 
money supply) is given from equation (21) as: 
(T/n)t-I  Y/P(7rt +  r*)  (38) 
and the percentage of money substitutes by  :27 
(Pt  I1  -  [1  +  k(Vr~t+  ?r*  -  Vl.*)]e  k(7t+r  r)  (Tt  ?  0), 
(39) 
ot  0  (77t  <  0). 
Presumably, values of  (T/n)t and  4t  (with  implied values of  7t)  are 
chosen over time so as to minimize some conception of inflationary costs. 
In attempting to quantify these costs below, we neglect the influence of 
money substitutes (take k  0) in order to keep the algebra manageable.28 
Assume that the  actual rate of  price change,  ITt,  prevails over some 
time interval, T. The cost associated with maintaining an effective rate, 
t7e,  over this interval is: 
Z = T[(M/P)(-,t + r*) +  =  -T  [-4(2t  ?  r*) + T4].  (40) 
transactions in which the benefits of money as a payments medium are high (T/P 
increases  as YIP  increases-though this is likely to contradict  the previous  simplifying 
assumption that [F/P]i  and [Y/P]i  are independently distributed). In this case the 
income elasticity is raised, and money is more likely to emerge as a luxury. 
27  It is assumed that the same 7,  value is appropriate for Tin,  D, and any other 
decision variables  that are relevant for (M/P)D. 
28 Essentially, we concentrate on the payments period as a decision variable, and 
therefore  restrict  attention to individuals  who retain the conventional money supply. 
As far as relative shifts in and out of substitutes (changes in 0)  differ from relative 
shifts in the payments  period, some error will be introduced  in the generation of  7e* 
The error is likely to be small for small values of qD  (see n. 24), and may become 
important as  1D  becomes large. However, the direction of error is not immediately 
clear, and further  analysis would be required  to ascertain  it. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1245 
Substituting for Tin from equation (38) (with A  [a/P]/[YIP])  we 
obtain after simplifying: 
Z  =  TAYP 
(t  +  r* +  7Te  +  r*).  (41) 
If  rTe  is  set equal to the actual rate, ATts  the cost is (assuming  7Tt +  r* >  0): 
Z =  2T(A  YIP)  Vart  +  r*.  (42) 
Therefore, the cost of maintaining an effective rate different from the 
actual rate (over time T) is (after simplifying): 
Z  Z  =  T.A  P  (\aTt  +  r* -  T  +  r*)2.  (43) 
A1T  +  r* (V 
Clearly,  the minimum  cost, Z -  Z = 0, obtains  at ni =  Xt. 
Presumably, if  rt were perceived instantaneously, and  7Te (that is,  Tin 
and other implied decision variables) could be adjusted costlessly with a 
zero time lag, we would always have 
e  =  vt.  Assuming that the lag in 
perception  of  Tt  can  be  neglected,  the  essential  characteristic for  the 
existence of 7t  #  vt is a nonzero cost associated with changes in ve (that is, 
with changes in Tln, et cetera). Let a denote the real (fixed) cost attached 
to  making changes in  Tre (the cost  is assumed to  be invariant with the 
amount of the change). In general, if  7Te is varied more frequently, the 
a  cost  rises, but the  average cost  of  being out  of  equilibrium (setting 
VV  e  +  r* =A  V/7r  + r* is equation [43]) declines. The complete descrip- 
tion of the tradeoff requires a specification of the mechanism by which v 
is generated. 
The model adopted here involves the application of an (S, s) policy to a 
stochastic inventory model of the type utilized by Miller and Orr (1966) 
in  a different context.  Assume that at time zero an economic  unit has 
just adjusted its effective rate to equal the current actual rate (0-O  = 
Future actual rates are assumed to be observed as averages over discrete 
time periods: 7fT  V2T7.  .*  with a fixed observation interval, ar.  The variable, 
aVt  +  r*, is assumed to follow a symmetric random walk with fixed step 
size c, beginning at V7v0 +  r* at time zero. That is, VBUT  +  r* =  y'ijT+  r* 
?  e with probability 2,  and Vi/r  +  r*  -  E with probability 1; VI2v  +  r* 
=  /Vir  +  r*  +  E with  I probability  each,  and  so  on.  The  economic  unit 
selects  ceiling  and floor values  of  \/r  +  r*,  V/7ro  +  r* +  hu and  \/TO  +  r* 
-  hL,  at which adjustments in 7re occur (that is, the unit sets Vnre  +  r* = 
N/vo +  r* +  hu  if the ceiling is reached, and V1Te +  r* =  V/v0 +  r* -hL 
if the floor is reached).29  Because the cost of being out of equilibrium is 
29  The realism of this process can be questioned on two (interrelated)  levels: (I) 
Do  individuals behave this way? (2) Does the actual course of rates of price change 
approximate  a random  walk? Since  1t  is endogenous  at the aggregate  level, the second 1246  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
symmetric about  Pro,  an  optimal  solution  involves  hU  =  hL =  h.30  The 
higher the selected value of h, the smaller the adjustment (U.)  cost, but the 
larger the  average out-of-equilibrium cost.  The  tradeoff is  formalized 
below. 
Let x  =  (V/7rt ?  r* -  e  +  r*)/E  denote the random variable (with 
zero origin and unit step size) which is subject to the random walk. The 
density of x is determined by the difference equation: 
f(x,t)  =  f(x  -  1, t -  1) + 
I 
f(x  +  1, t -  1); x  =  0;  -  h <  x <  h- 
(44) 
Confining attention to the steady-state distribution defined by: 
f(x)  =  f(x-  1) +  f(x  +  #);x  0  0;-  h  <  x  <  -  (45) 
with boundary conditions: 
f(h/E)  =  f(-Ih/E)  =  0, 
f(0)  = 
I [f(  -  _)  + f(-1)]  + 
I  - 
h +  1  + f(+  1)]  (46) 
h/c 
Z  f(x)=l, 
x=  -hIE 
the equation can be solved in the form f(x)  =  A1 + B1x (x  >  0),f(x)  = 
A2 +  B2x (x  < 0). 
question  involves,  in  particular,  the  behavior  of  the  rate  of  change  of  the  money 
supply.  Because  the random-walk  process  is nonstationary,  it is unlikely  to  provide  a 
realistic  long-run  description  of  the rate of  price change  or of the  rate of  change  of 
the money  supply.  Nevertheless,  the process  may provide  a useful  basis for short-run 
analysis  of individual  adjustment  behavior.  In  any  case  the  important  assumptions 
seem  to  be: (1) a fixed perception  interval,  r,  (2)  the  symmetric  nature  of  the  walk, 
and  (3)  serial  independence.  The  second  assumption  reflects  a  (long-run)  neutral 
stance  toward  acceleration  or  deceleration  of  prices,  and appears  to  be reasonable. 
The third assumption  (which  rules out extrapolations  of  the recent  mt trend)  is more 
questionable.  Serial dependence  would  affect the form, though  not the general nature, 
of  the  results.  The  first assumption  is critical  for the model,  and  reflects a  segment 
of  behavior  that  has not  been considered  at  all.  Essentially,  the random-walk  proc- 
ess regards any observed  value  of  ITt  as the best  estimate  of  future 7T  values.  Accord- 
ingly,  no  distinction  is  made  between  expected  and actual  rates of inflation,  and the 
explanation  for  rt4  #  7t  derives  solely  from costs  of adjustment  of  we.  As  the  percep- 
tion  interval  (r)  tends  to  zero,  the  model  implies  that  each  instantaneous  value  of 
(I/p)(dp)/(dt)  is,  by itself,  the  best estimate  of  future -t's.  Maintaining  a finite value 
of  r  substitutes  an  average  value  of  (l/p)(dp)/(dt)  for  an  instantaneous  value,  but 
does  not  change  the  fundamental  problem.  A complete  model  would  consider  both 
expectational  and  adjustment  factors  in the formation  of  the  effective  rate (ITe),  and 
would  remove the ad hoc  perception  interval  that was necessitated  by the lack  of  an 
expectations  mechanism. 
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Using the four boundary conditions to evaluate the constants, the solu- 
tion is: 
f(X)  =  EX(  -h  (X >  0), 
(47) 
f(x)  =  h (1  +  e)  (x  <  0). 
In  equation  (43)  the  cost  of  being  out  of  equilibrium depends  on 
(EX)2  =  (vVt  +  r* -  V0  + r*)2. Using  the density  function  of equation 
(47),  the average out-of-equilibrium cost  (per unit of time) can be cal- 
culated  as:31 
=  -  A  E(-X)2  A  Y  *  (h)'  (48) 
where,  E denotes an expected  value. As suggested  above, the (expected) 
out-of-equilibrium  cost increases  with h. 
The second cost element (a cost) involves the expected number  of 
7re  adjustments  per unit of time. Feller has shown32  that the expected 
duration  (expected  number  of trials between  hits at the ceiling or floor) 
for the random-walk  process  under  consideration  is: 
D =  h2/E2( expected  number  of trials).  (49) 
The above expression  for D can be converted  to time units by multi- 
plying  by r (time per trial)  to obtain: 
h27 
D = 
E2  (expected  number  of time units).  (50) 
31  E(x2)  =  6  [2  x2(1  -  h)  +  j x 2(1  +  ) 
=  _2  -  X3] 
=  h  [E  (6  +  1  +  1-h  ((h/E)  (h!E  +  1))] 
(h/  +  1) [2h/E?  1 _  h/E +  1] 
(h/E)2-  1  I  _h2-E2 
6  E2  6 
h  2 
-62 if h/lE>  1. 
Therefore,  E(Ex)2  h2/6. 
32  Feller  1968, p. 349.  In Feller's  model,  the barriers are at  0 and a, with an inter- 
mediate starting point at z; while in our model,  the barriers are at  +  h, with a starting 
point  of 0.  However,  Feller's  results are readily  adaptable  to  our  case. 1248  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
The  above  expression measures the  expected amount  of  time  between 
contacts with the upper or lower barrier (that is, between adjustments of 
1e).  The expected number of contacts (adjustments) per unit of time can 
be approximated by 1/D (see Miller and Orr 1966, p. 421). 
Letting m denote the number of contacts in time T, we have: 
E(m/T)  l/DD  -=2  (51) 
As suggested above, the higher h, the lower the (expected) number of 
adjustments per time, and the lower the associated (expected) a cost. 
The variance of the Bernoulli process involved in the symmetric random 
walk  can  be  derived (as  a  function  of  time)  as  Cut =  (E2/r)  t,  where  t 
denotes the total  elapsed time since the  start at time zero.33 At  t =  1 
(month) the variance is: 
a72  =-6  =  monthly variance of V-rrt +  r*  (52) 
Therefore, the expected adjustment cost per unit of time may be written 
(from equation [51]) as: 
a2 
E(Za)  =  a. E(m/T)  =  a  *  (53) 
The total expected cost per unit of time (as a function of h) is (from 
equations  [48]  and [53]):34 
E(cost/time)  E(Z -  Z) +  cc E(m/T)  T 
_  A YIPor  =  V  +e  h2 + 
a.2.  (54) 
6 0/r  +  r* 
The  value  of  h2  that  minimize  this  expected  cost  is  given  from 
a(Cost)/ah2 =  0 as: 
h2  A  Or6  X/p  a(lTO +  r*)4  (55) 
On an individual level, ire is shifted or kept constant according to whether 
a newly observed value of art is sufficient to reach a ceiling or floor (with 
the  ceiling  and  floor  positions  determined  from  equation  [55]).  The 
3  See Miller and Orr, p. 419. This unconstrained  variance is, of course, derived 
independently  of the barrier  positions at +? , and, therefore, does not correspond  to 
E(ex)2,  which  was calculated  above. 
34  This analysis  neglects the fact that subsequent  starting  points do not correspond 
to the initial point (\/ 
e  +  r*). In fact, the starting points conform to  a modified 
symmetric  random walk with stochastic time interval  and varying  step size. Since the 
process is symmetric,  neglecting  it may be a satisfactory first approximation. INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  I249 
aggregate  7Te  behavior depends  on  the  proportion  of  units that  attain 
ceilings or floors in a particular time interval. An approximation to the 
aggregate response is described below. 
Assume  that  a  particular value  of  Ex =  VNrt  +  r* -  V0r +  r* pre- 
vails at some time. The likely conclusion of the random walk which origi- 
nates at x (that is, the relative probabilities of hitting the ceiling or floor 
first) depends on the position of x relative to h and -h.  It can be shown 
that (see Feller 1968, p. 345): 
Pr(+ h) =  h +  Ex 
2h 
(56) 
Pr(-h)  =  2h 
-E 
where Pr(+h)  is the probability of terminating at  +h  when the process 
originates at x, and analogously for Pr(-h). 
The  expected duration of  the  walk  which  originates at x  is  (Feller, 
p. 349): 
D  =  (h -  Ex)(h +  EX)  (57) 
ar2 
Therefore, the expected number of adjustments per time is: 
U2 
E(m/T)  x=  (h -  Ex)(h +  EX)  (58) 
The expected number of ceiling hits per time can be approximated by: 
M  +  o~~~~~r2  (9 
E(jy)  ~  Pr(+h).E(m/T)  2h(h +  EX)) 
Similarly, the expected number of floor hits is: 
E(  LI'  Pr(-  h) E(inlT)  -  (60)  \T  /2h(h  -  Ex)' 
Each ceiling hit produces an increase in (an individual's)  \/7re  +  r* by 
h,  and  each  floor  hit  a  reduction by h.  The  net  (expected) change in 
ve+r*  is given by: 
d 
(V7T 
?  r*)  .  h4Emj -  E  'nT)] 
dt  (  )~h[tT  )  (T  ) 
(61) 
or2  C  1  2EX  or2Ex 
2  (hex  h +  ex  h2  _  (EX)2  h2 
(if h >>  EX).35 
3  That  is,  the  original (in  effect, average aggregate) deviation,  Vot  +  r*  - 
Vote  +  r*, is assumed to be small relative to that deviation (h) which produces a 
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Substituting Ex =  (V  I7V7r -  I  )e+  r*), and h2 =  h2 from equation 
(55): 
d  +  (YP'(e  + r*) - 
P(V1t  ?  r*  -  +r.  dt  6 
(62) 
Equation (62) describes the expected change over time in (an individ- 
ual's)  ~e  ?  r*  as a function of the current gap (Vot  +  r*-  aV  ?  r*). 
With the  additional (difficult to  evaluate) assumption that the  average 
aggregate value of  /7rt +  r* -  /7T  +  r* yields a satisfactory approxi- 
mation to average behavior in the form of equation (62), the relationship 
can be used to explain the trend over time in the average aggregate value 
of ir,  which is assumed to be relevant for aggregate money demand in the 
form of equation (37). 
The first term on the right side of equation (62), [(A Y/P)/6a]1/2,  may 
perhaps be satisfactorily regarded as a constant. However, a, the square 
root  of  the  monthly  variance of  I  ,  generally  depends  on  the 
intensity of inflation. Provisionally, this dependence is approximated in the 
following manner. 
Let [t =  (l/M)(dM/dt)  denote the proportionate rate of change of the 
money stock. The corresponding amount of inflationary-financed  (govern- 
ment)  expenditure  is:  GM =  At M/P.  Assuming  MIP  M/PD  and 
At  , we have (from equation [37] with k  0): 
dt  dT(  M/P)  2  (1  +  + r*) dt*  (63) 
Therefore: 
dl-  2  (1  r*  dGM 
WTi  ui/~  A+  2r~j!dt  (64) 
If  government expenditure is  financed by  a  combination  of  money 
creation and tax revenues (G =  GM +  GT) we have: 
dG  =dGM  dGT  (5 
dt  dt  +F  dt  (65) 
If the primary function of inflationary finance is to offset (unexpected?) 
variations in tax revenue (that is, dG/dt  0), we have: 
dGM  _  dGT  (66) 
dt  -dt(6 
Letting 0 denote the proportional rate of change of nominal tax revenues, 
we have: 
dG  GT[O  -  f]  (67) INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1251 
Therefore, the magnitude of fluctuation in tax revenues depends on the 
average magnitude of IO  -  r.  Provisionally, we assume that this average 
size is proportional to _rre. In this case: 
dGT  g.  7,e (g  =  constant).  (68) 
Therefore, from equations (66) and (64): 
|d |  2gl/e (1 -  r*)  (69)  dt  ~M/P  u+2i 
Using [  e,  M/P  t  M/PD, and substituting from equation (37): 
+  r*,  ~AY/P  1  _  (I  -  e +  2r(70) 
where (P  is given by equation (39). 
If Id/(dt) V/Ir +  r*I can be approximated by  Id/(dt) /  + r*j, and if 
a (the monthly standard deviation of  A+r*)  is proportional to  Id/(dt) 
x  V/r +  r*I, we have (from equation  [62]) a mechanism for generating 
effective rates of inflation: 
dtV/e?  r*  b*(e  +  r*)l/4  (1  _  (l  E  +  2r* 
_ 
x  (  r*~  V  /7,e +  r*),  (71) 
where  b =  constant  >  0. 
If  e>>  r*: 
d  e_____  e) 
Vt  /7Te  b(Te)3I4 
-  _  (,\/7r-  - 
(72)  dt  (1  (P)D  -V~) 
The mechanism in equations (71) and (72) may be compared with the 
original adaptive-expectations model (Cagan, p. 37): 
dt (7,e)  =  Y(,r-  _  e),  (y  >  0).  (73) 
The new mechanism differs in two respects. First, as a reflection of the 
underlying inflationary costs,  the  mechanism (equations  [71] and  [72]) 
emerges in square root, rather than linear, form. Second, the coefficient 
of adjustment is not constant, but increases with the rate of inflation (with 
(7Te)3/4[1/(l  -  (I)]  in  equation  [72]).  Cagan's  empirical  results  suggested 
that a rising adjustment  coefficient might be a more appropriate  mechanism 
(Cagan, pp. 58-64).  The current model provides a theoretically derived 
mechanism of this type, which is used for an empirical study in the second 
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II.  Empirical Results on Demand for Money during  Hyperinflations 
The theoretical model of demand for money has been applied to data on 
four  post-World  War  I  hyperinflations (Austria,  Germany,  Hungary, 
Poland) previously studied by Cagan (1956)36  and Allais (1966). The data 
for each case differ somewhat from that employed  by Cagan, and are 
described briefly in the Appendix tables. The demand-for-money function 
is derived from the theoretical model (equations [37] and [39]): 
log(M/PD)t  =  ac- +  U-2.l0g(9re  +  r*)t +  log(1  -  (4t)  +  Ut,  (74) 
where: 
(1  -  t)  =  [I  +  k(Ve+  r* -  Vr*)tjek(vze+r  -  )  (t  ?  0);  (75) 
(1  -at)=  1,  (-~~~~~~~r*  <  7Te < 0); 
and ut is thought of as an independently, normally distributed disturbance 
term. In the theoretical model, a,  =  log (A Y/P) (though this coefficient is 
likely to  be affected by aggregation) and a2  =  -0.5.  We have assumed, 
additionally,  for  the  current  empirical  study  that  Y/P z  constant; 
r*  constant  ~0;  (M/PD)t  (M/P)t. 
The accuracy of  Y/P  %  constant for the relatively short hyperinflation- 
ary experiences under consideration has been discussed in  Cagan (pp. 
97-114).  The type of information that Cagan considers can be used to 
construct rough employment indices for the four cases. These indices are 
contained in the Appendix tables. Considering the coverage and accuracy 
of the basic data, the indices seem fairly reliable (as a general indicator) 
for Austria and Germany, less reliable for Poland, and mostly unreliable 
for Hungary. The overall indication is that variations in real income were 
small relative to changes in the inflation rate, so that taking  Y/P  con- 
stant may be satisfactory (though this conclusion is especially questionable 
for Hungary and uncertain for Poland). Because of the crude nature of the 
employment data, the addition of real income to the regression equations 
has not been attempted. 
In general, the real rate of discount (r*) should be somewhat above the 
(riskless) real rate of return in an economy. Average real rates of return 
during the hyperinflations were apparently small and possibly negative. 
Accordingly, we expect values of r* near zero, and, in any case, negligible 
in comparison with the inflation-rate variable (ire).  Therefore, we have set 
r* =  0 and have not attempted to estimate r* from the data. 
36  Three  cases from Cagan's  original seven have been excluded: post-World War I 
Russia and World War II Greece and Hungary. The Russian case was excluded 
because  the assumption  of constant real income appeared  unreasonable  and adequate 
income data was unavailable. The money-supply data for  Greece was unreliable 
(Cagan, p. 106), and the variation in real income during the war was apparently 
substantial  (International Labor Review,  December 1945, p. 650).  The available data 
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The possible error involved with taking M/PD  =  M/P is not explicitly 
considered in this paper. 
The effective rate of inflation (7Te)  in equations (74) and (75) is assumed 
to be generated by the mechanism of equation (72): 
d  i  W-e  =  b(re)314  I1  (1  -;; -V/r),  (76)  d  (I  -  4)gii 
where, 'D  is given in equation (75). Since the model is applied to discrete 
(monthly) data, a discrete approximation has been used  :37 
7/rt  a  t +  (  p-  t) 
e/7- 
t  =  1  -  eb(at)  (3  i  )  (77) 
where,  Tt is the average rate of price change over the interval (t  -  1, t), 
Xe =  (7Te  +  7TD  and  t =  ) 
The coefficients to be estimated for each case are a1, a2,  k, and b. The 
method of estimation is a nonlinear iterative routine for minimizing the 
sum of squared residuals in each regression. This procedure corresponds 
to  maximum  likelihood  estimation  if  the  error disturbances (Ut)  are 
independently and  normally distributed.38 Since the  primary objective 
is to test the theory, we list the a priori conjectures on each coefficient: 
1.  a 1 =  log (A Y/P): Without information on real income levels, this 
coefficient depends on arbitrary  index levels, and cannot be tested. 
2.  a2  =  -0.5:  This point value is the strongest a priori information to 
be tested. 
3.  k: This parameter determines the percentage of money substitutes 
(4)) as a function of  7Te (equation [75]). The higher k, the larger the per- 
centage of substitutes and the smaller the demand for money at a given 
value of  ire:  k  =  4A/(F/P)  =  4Va/ Y/Q(T/P) (see Section IC), where 
a! Y is the ratio of transactions cost to transactions volume and T/P is the 
average cost of employing money substitutes (per amount of transaction). 
To obtain some notion of the order of magnitude of k, we assume (taking 
time  units  of  months),  0.5/400  <  alY  <  2.0/400,  .10 <_  T/P  <  .20. 
Correspondingly, the limiting values of k-  are 0.7  <  k <  2.8 (months1/2). 
Negative values of -7T  were set equal to zero in order to obtain Virt in equation 
(77). In fact, few negative values occurred  so that no major adjustment  was required. 
Nevertheless, the necessity for this adjustment reflects an  incompleteness in  the 
generation mechanism for  ,e,  which may stem from the lack of  an expectations 
mechanism  (see n. 29). 
38  See Cagan, pp. 93-94.  One problem with the estimation is that Pt influences 
both sides of the equation. This problem  is not serious when Pt << 1, but may become 
important for the most extreme observations. Unfortunately, obtaining a reduced 
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Obviously, this limit is both wide and arbitrary, but k  >  0 is a funda- 
mental implication of the theory: k =  0 (an infinite cost for money sub- 
stitutes) corresponds to  a constant inflation-rate elasticity, while k >  0 
corresponds to an increasing (absolute) elasticity. The model is supported 
if k =  0 can be rejected in favor of k >  0. 
The k parameter may also be viewed in terms of its variation among 
different cases. The theory suggests (for given values of a! Y) that k is 
larger the smaller the value of T/P.  Therefore, higher k values correspond 
to situations where money substitutes are more readily available (that is, 
less costly). However, there is little a priori basis for determining relative 
T/P  values among the cases studied, so that equality among the k values 
forms the basic null hypothesis. 
4.  b: This coefficient determines the speed with which effective rates of 
inflation  (,e)  respond to  actual rates (ir) (equation  [77]). A  priori, we 
expect b >  0 and approximately equal for each case:  b =  0 implies that 
7e  does not respond at all to  changes in ir, therefore, b =  0 should be 
rejectable in favor of b >  0.  Order-of-magnitude notions of b were not 
derived. 
The a priori conjectures on the coefficients are tested by means of the 
likelihood ratio (A).  The asymptotic x2 distribution of -2  1oge A  is utilized 
to construct 95 percent confidence intervals for each coefficient.39 These 
intervals can then be used to construct acceptance regions for two-sided 
(5 percent) tests of the a priori conjectures  on  each  coefficient.40 The 
tests were applied independently for each coefficient in order to  obtain 
separate conclusions  on  each  conjecture. While these  tests  depend  on 
asymptotic  distribution theory  and  are  not  actually  independent,  the 
greatest hedge on their validity seems to be the assumed serial independence 
of the errors. 
The likelihood  ratio was  also  used to  test  the joint  null hypothesis, 
a2  =  -0.5,  for the four cases combined, and to test the null hypothesis 
of equality for a,2, k, and b coefficients among the different cases. 
The basic empirical results are contained in table 2. This table contains 
point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the coefficients of 
each  regression, along  with  various  measures of  the  fit.  The  overall 
estimates of a2,  k, and b are based on a combined regression for the four 
cases. For example, the overall estimate of a2  (-.515)  is that value which 
39-2  loge(A) -  x2(p),  where p is the number of restrictions  contained in the null 
hypothesis (see Cagan, pp. 93-96). In the present case we have: 
-2  loge A =  T[loge  (SSE*/SSE)]  x2(p), 
where SSE is  the overall minimum error sum of  squares, SSE* is the minimum 
subject to p restrictions,  and T is the number of observations. 
40 If the null hypothesis involves an interval rather than a point value, the (maxi- 
mum) type one error probability corresponding  to a 95 percent confidence interval 
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yields a minimum overall sum of  (weighted)41 squared residuals in the 
constrained regression where a2 estimates are equal for each case. Accor- 
dingly, this regression involves  the imposition of  three independent re- 
strictions  on  the  fit.  Overall estimates  of  k  (1.27)  and  b  (0.805)  are 
obtained in a similar manner. 
Evaluation  of Empirical  Results 
1. Coefficient Estimates 
a2  estimates.-The  a  priori value  of  -0.5  is  within  the  95  percent 
confidence interval for each case. Therefore, the  null hypothesis,  a2  = 
-0.5,  is accepted at the .05 level for each case. The strongest result is 
provided by the German case, for which the 95 percent confidence interval 
(-.49,  -.54)  is especially narrow. 
An  overall  test  of  equality  among  the  four  a2  values  involves  the 
likelihood ratio with 3 df, based on the overall estimate of a2  (-.515).42 
The relevant statistic is  -2  loge A =  5.42, which is less than X2(3).o5  = 
7.82, so that the null hypothesis of equality among the a2'S is accepted at 
the .05 level. 
The  overall  hypothesis,  a2  =  -0.5,  can  be  tested  by  constraining 
a2  =  -0.5  in  each  case.  The  resulting statistic  is:  -2  loge A =  7.40, 
which is less than X2(4).o5  =  9.49. Therefore, the overall null hypothesis 
a2  =  -0.5,  is accepted at the .05 level. 
Because of the restrictive nature of the null hypothesis (a2  =  -  0.5, a 
point  value) the empirical results for the  a2  coefficients provide strong 
support for the underlying theory. 
k estimates.-The  point estimates of k are, in each case, positive and 
within the a priori interval, 0.7  <  k  <  2.8. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that  each  k  lies  within  this  interval is  accepted.  The  null  hypothesis, 
k =  0,  is rejected at the  5 percent level in favor of k  >  0 for Austria, 
41 The  weighting scheme follows  from the  usual treatment of  heteroscedastic 
disturbances. Let (SLE), =  V(S9E/T)j  denote the estimated standard error of the 
residuals  from the unconstrained  regression  for the ith case. In performing  an overall 
regression, the observations for the ith case are weighted by l/SEEj =  V/T/SSEj. 
Therefore,  we wish to minimize the overall weighted sum of squared  residuals: 
4  SSE* 
Tt  t 
where SSE* is the (restricted)  sum of squared  residuals  for the ith case in the overall 
regression,  and the summation is over the (four) cases in the sample. 
42  Based on the weighting scheme of n. 41 above, and the likelihood-ratio distri- 
bution discussed  in n. 39 above, we have: 
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Germany, and Poland,  but  must be  accepted for  Hungary. Therefore, 
three of the four cases considered substantiate an increasing inflation-rate 
elasticity, as was suggested by the money-substitute section of the theory. 
The  null  hypothesis  of  equality  among  k  values  for  the  four  cases 
corresponds to a statistic:  -2  loge A  5.19, which is less than X2(3).o5 = 
7.82. Therefore, equality among the k's is accepted at the .05 level. The 
implication is that no significant divergence existed in the availability of 
money substitutes among the four cases considered. 
b estimates.-The  point estimates are positive in each case, and signif- 
icantly greater than zero. The null hypothesis of equality among the four 
cases corresponds to a statistic:  -2  loge A  9.22, which is greater than 
x2(3).  =  7.82  (though  less  than  X2(3).02 =  9.84).  Therefore,  equality 
among the b coefficients is rejected at the .05 level. Observation of the 
individual confidence intervals suggests that the chief "cause" of rejection 
is  the  low  b estimate  for  Austria, relative to  those  for  Germany and 
Poland.  Since there are no  obvious  theoretical grounds for  divergence 
among b values,  this  result may be  symptomatic of  some  flaw in  the 
mechanism by which 7re is generated. 
2.  The Overall Fit and Comparison with Cagan's Results 
In general the regression fits for Austria, Germany, and Poland (in terms 
of  standard error of estimate  [SEE]) are "good,"  and apparently quite 
similar.43 The average errors for Hungary appear to be significantly higher 
than those for the other three cases. 
Some perspective on the fit may be gained by a comparison with Cagan's 
results. Table 3 contains regression results in the form of Cagan's model :44 
log (M/P)t  =  a3  +  47Tt,(7 
Ae  +  (78) 
7Tt  fot  +  (I  -  P)7t  X 
In general, the average errors in Cagan's form are about twice as large as 
those in table 2, and the serial correlation of residuals is substantially more 
pronounced (see below). 
3.  Autocorrelation of Residuals 
A major cause of concern in the empirical results (table 2) is the generally 
low  Durbin-Watson statistic, which indicates positive  serial correlation 
4  No statistical tests for equality among error variances  have been attempted. 
4  Cagan's model has been refitted here because of minor differences  in data and 
in periods of observation,  and because the original study did not include some of the 
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TABLE  3 
CAGAN  MODEL 
log  (M/P)t  =  63  +  4- 7Tt 
A=  Pnrt +  (1  -  g), 
Country  c3  Lt4  f  AAE  SEE  R2  D-W. 
Austria .  .  .  .  .  .  2.67  -4.09  .171  .069  .090  .955  .53 
(-3.6,  -4.5)  (.15,  .21) 
Germany  .  .  .  .  .  2.43  -  3.79  .176  .108  .127  .976  .25 
(-3.3,  -4.3)  (.14,.21) 
Hungary ..  .. 1.40  - 5.53  .139  .114  .142  .898  .31 
(-4.6,  -6.9)  (.10,.20) 
Poland  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.64  -  2.56  .291  .091  .109  .963  .32 
(-2.1,  -3.3)  (.18,  .43) 
NOTE.-See  table  2.  Sample  periods  the  same. 
of residuals for Hungary and Poland, and possible positive correlation for 
Germany. Only in the Austrian case can serial correlation be ruled out.45 
In principle, serial correlation does not produce inconsistency in point 
estimates, although it  does  reduce efficiency. The  impact on  statistical 
tests is likely to be more serious since the underlying distribution theory 
requires serially independent errors. One approach to  the  problem in- 
volves the explicit specification of a residual process which exhibits serial 
correlation (for example, a first-order Markov process). However, since 
the presence of serial correlation is likely to be an indicator of some sort of 
misspecification, the best remedy is a fuller specification of  the model. 
This attempt at fuller specification constitutes a useful  area for  future 
research. At this point it is clear that the statistical results for Austria and 
Germany are considerably more reliable than  those  for  Hungary and 
Poland. Despite the problem of serial correlation, it seems clear that the 
empirical results provide considerable support for the theory developed in 
Part I. 
III.  Extensions of the Model 
Future extensions of the model aimed particularly at removing residual 
serial correlation will  involve:  (a)  inclusion  of  additional  explanatory 
variables, such as real income and seasonal factors; (b) further investiga- 
45  While the Durbin-Watson  test is not strictly applicable to this nonlinear model, 
it should provide a useful measure of  autocorrelation. Assuming that the model 
comprises  four independent  variables  (plus a constant term),  the statistics  for Hungary 
and Poland indicate positive serial correlation at the 1 percent level. The German 
statistic indicates positive correlation at the 5 percent level, but is inconclusive at 
2.5 percent.  The Austrian  statistic is inconclusive  at 5 percent, but the null hypothesis 
of serial independence  is accepted at 2.5 percent (see Durbin and Watson 1951, pp. 
1  73-75). INFLATION  AND DEMAND  FOR  MONEY  1259 
tion of  the effective rate of  inflation mechanism, possibly involving the 
introduction  of  an  expectations mechanism; (c)  reconsideration of  the 
assumption of continuous equilibrium between actual and desired money 
balances. 
The theoretical results will be extended to a consideration of inflationary 
finance and the welfare cost of inflation. 
The  model will  be  applied to  an  empirical study of  the  inflationary 
experiences in Latin America and in other countries. 
Appendix 
TABLE Al 
AUSTRIA 
End-of-  Log (M/P)t Log (M/P)t  Employment 
Month  Pt~  7T  74e  (Actual)  (Estimated)  Residual  Index 
1921: 
January .  .076  .060  .052  2.349  2.385  -  .036  99.3 
February  .072  .156  .058  2.314  2.325  -  .011  99.5 
March  .  .083  .068  .058  2.314  2.317  -  .003  99.7 
April.  .080  .045  .057  2.363  2.329  .034  99.8 
May.  .079  .006  .051  2.370  2.394  -  .024  99.8 
June.  .076  .144  .057  2.317  2.335  -  .019  99.8 
July  .  .  ....077  -  .108  .048  2.509  2.429  .080  99.7 
August  .  .  .078  .275  .059  2.313  2.308  .005  99.8 
September  .  .089  .292  .073  2.212  2.186  .025  99.9 
October  .  .  .113  .496  .102  1.974  1.983  -.008  100.0 
November.  .144  .597  .148  1.678  1.747  -.069  100.0 
December  .184  .375  .182  1.670  1.612  .059  99.6 
1922: 
January .  .213  .357  .214  1.579  1.502  .077  98.7 
February  .201  .142  .199  1.587  1.553  .034  98.2 
March  .  .194  .027  .153  1.716  1.726  -  .009  98.3 
April.  .169  .154  .153  1.698  1.724  -.027  98.1 
May.  .187  .343  .183  1.493  1.608  -.115  98.5 
June.  .203  .297  .204  1.529  1.536  -  .007  98.9 
July  .  .  ....254  .654  .294  1.232  1.281  -  .049  99.0 
August  .  .  .348  .852  .455  0.923  0.953  -0.29  99.0 
September  .  .344  .108  .309  1.339  1.246  .093  98.7 
October.  .  .260  .024  .204  1.580  1.534  .046  97.6 
November .  .184  -.047  .136  1.766  1.800  -.034  96.1 
December .  .142  -  .036  .100  1.980  1.993  -  .013  94.2 
Notes  to Appendix Data 
Units  for  Pt~,  7T, and 74e are per month. Employment  indices  are  based  on 
100.0 =  full employment  in June 1920  (see the discussion  for Austria below). 
1. Austria: M  is an end-of-month index of  the note circulation of  the 
Austrian Republic (Walre de Bordes 1924, pp. 48-50); P, from December 
1920 is  the end-of-month cost-of-living index (excluding housing) of  the 
Osterreiche  Volkswirt  (Walre de Bordes, pp. 88, 89). From January 1919 to 
December  1920, an index  of  food  prices for a working  family  has been used I260  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE A2 
GERMANY 
Log (M/P)t Log (M/P)t  Employment 
Midmonth  Pt  rt  7Te  (Actual)  (Estimated) Residual  Index 
1921: 
January .  .057  .018  .029  2.416  2.317  .099  95.8 
February  .052  -.029  .026  2.435  2.374  .061  95.6 
March  ..  048  -.008  .023  2.452  2.426  .026  96.6 
April  ..  046  -.010  .021  2.469  2.476  -.007  96.5 
May  .  .  .043  -.006  .019  2.483  2.523  -.039  96.7 
June  .  .  .042  .042  .020  2.465  2.502  -.037  97.4 
July  .  ...  044  .070  .022  2.425  2.463  -.038  97.9 
August  ..  .  .047  .064  .023  2.385  2.428  -.043  98.3 
September  .  .048  .032  .024  2.400  2.419  -.020  99.2 
October  .  .  050  .091  .026  2.368  2.369  -.002  99.4 
November .  .055  .168  .030  2.272  2.282  -.010  99.2 
December  .060  .085  .033  2.293  2.240  .053  99.1 
1922: 
January  .  064  .056  .034  2.302  2.219  .083  97.4 
February  .066  .190  .041  2.146  2.127  .018  98.0 
March  .  .074  .177  .048  2.038  2.043  -.005  99.7 
April.  .086  .174  .055  1.944  1.960  -.016  99.9 
May.  .093  .104  .059  1.903  1.923  -.019  100.1 
June  ..  097  .086  .062  1.921  1.901  .020  100.3 
July  .  ..  107  .262  .076  1.774  1.780  -.006  100.3 
August  ...  .132  .358  .102  1.584  1.619  -.035  100.3 
September  .  .169  .544  .152  1.295  1.385  -.091  100.2 
October.  .  .221  .509  .212  1.120  1.180  -.060  99.6 
November.  .297  .717  .331  0.833  0.895  -.062  99.1 
December  .357  .442  .369  0.890  0.822  .068  98.3 
1923: 
January  ..  .  .390  .479  .410  0.786  0.750  .037  96.9 
February  .457  .915  .616  0.544  0.456  .089  95.9 
March  .433  .096  .335  0.908  0.887  .022  95.5 
April..  ..288  .004  .186  1.216  1.263  -.047  94.2 
May...  .231  .259  .202  1.163  1.213  -.050  95.0 
June...  .288  .725  .319  0.876  0.920  -.044  97.1 
July  ....  463  1.304  .692  0.463  0.365  .098  97.9 
August  .  .  .  .900  2.931 2.638  -0.966  -0.920  -.045  95.0 
(Statistische  Nachrichten, 1923, p.  195). Employment  is based on the number 
of  unemployed  (receiving  relief)  for  each  month  (Walre  de  Bordes,  p.  11), 
and  on  interpolated  population  data  from  the  UN  Demographic  Yearbook. 
The  index  is calculated  as  follows:  N  (employment)  =  L  (labor  force)  - 
(number  unemployed)  a-POP  (total  population)  -  b- U  (number  of  un- 
employed  from  data)  =  a -[POP  -  (b/a) U],  where  we  set a  1. Using  Q/L 
at  October  1921  (the  minimum  unemployment  date)  .005,  b/a  is  deter- 
mined and the index is calculated  for each month. 
2.  Germany:  M  is  an  index  of  total  legal  tender  (Sonderhefte  zur  Wirt- 
schaft und Statistik,  1925, pp. 45 ff.).  Until  December  1922 figures are inter- 
polated  to  the  middle  of  the  month  from  end-of-month  data.  For  1923, 
figures are available directly at the middle of the month;  P is an index of the 
cost  of living, available as a monthly  average from February,  1920 to  March, 
1923  (Statistisches  Jahrbuch far  das  Deutsche  Reich,  1924/25,  international INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  126i 
TABLE  A3 
HUNGARY 
End-of-  Log (MIP)t Log (M/P)t  Employment 
Month  Pt  rt  7T  (Actual)  (Estimated)  Residual  Index 
1921: 
October  .  .  .  .077  .077  .038  1.253  1.138  .115  (89.2) 
November.  .  .083  .214  .048  1.092  1.012  .080  (89.4) 
December  .  .  .086  -.006  .040  1.116  1.119  -.003  (89.7) 
1922: 
January  .  .076  -.018  .034  1.154  1.213  -.059  (89.9) 
February  .066  .053  .035  1.147  1.193  -.046  (90.1) 
March  .078  .152  .041  1.086  1.097  -.011  (90.3) 
April.  .082  .085  .044  1.045  1.055  -.010  (90.5) 
May.  .086  .023  .042  1.066  1.084  -.018  (90.7) 
June  .  .  087  .165  .050  0.957  0.987  -.030  (90.9) 
July.  .  .  .  .  .106  .299  .066  0.790  0.816  -  .025  (91.1) 
August  .  .  .  .125  .207  .079  0.770  0.705  .066  (91.4) 
September  .  .138  .225  .095  0.787  0.595  .192  (91.6) 
October.  .  .160  .213  .111  0.755  0.501  .254  (91.8) 
November  .  .148  -.010  .080  0.793  0.697  .096  92.0 
December  .129  .024  .071  0.821  0.769  .052  (93.0) 
1923: 
January  .  .128  .142  .079  0.650  0.707  -.058  (93.9) 
February  .121  .091  .080  0.586  0.696  -.110  (94.8) 
March  .  .157  .457  .119  0.220  0.456  -.236  95.8 
April  .  183  .243  .139  0.181  0.362  -.181  95.5 
May.  .196  .118  .134  0.238  0.381  -.142  98.4 
June.  .214  .444  .186  0.070  0.178  -.108  (98.3) 
July .  .  .  .  .  .294  .683  .299  -0.234  -0.133  -  .101  98.1 
August  .  .  .  .362  .481  .360  -0.146  -0.258  .112  99.1 
September  .  .350  .186  .293  0.061  -0.119  .180  98.2 
October.  .  .299  .058  .204  0.238  0.118  .120  98.4 
November  .  .238  .082  .170  0.295  0.234  .061  97.6 
December  .224  .121  .158  0.261  0.279  -.018  97.7 
1924: 
January  .  .  .  .220  .173  .162  0.240  0.266  -.026  96.9 
February  .  .  .241  .560  .236  -0.119  0.024  -.143  94.7 
table  1). From  April  1923 the index is available  on a weekly basis (Wirtschaft 
und Statistik,  January  1924, p.  12). From  November  1915 to  February  1920 
use has been made of an index of the retail price of food  (International Labour 
Review, September 1921, p. 301; October  1921, p. 84). The employment  index 
is  based  on  the  percentage  of  unemployed  trade  union  members  (Bresciani- 
Turroni  1937,  p.  449)  and  on  interpolated  population  figures  (UN  Demo- 
graphic  Yearbook). 
3.  Hungary:  M is an end-of-month  index of total  note  circulation  (Young 
1925, p. 321; Statistisches Jahrbuch  far das Deutsche Reich, 1926, international 
table  23); P,  from July,  1921 to  November,  1923, is an index  of retail prices 
(Young  1925,  p.  322),  which  apparently  relates  to  the  end  of  the  month 
(Annuaire Statistique Hongrois,  1931, p.  126). From  December  1923, P  is an 
end-of-month  index  of  the  cost-of-living  (Statistisches  Jahrbuch far  das 
Deutsche Reich, 1924/25, p. 86*). The indices were joined together by means of 
the overlap in November  1923. From January 1918 to July 1921 an index of the 1262  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE  A4 
POLAND 
Log (MIP)t Log  (M/P)t  Employment 
Midmonth  Pt  aTt 
e  (Actual)  (Estimated)  Residual  Index 
1922: 
January  .  .116  0.003  .062  1.610  1.552  .058  89.3 
February  .100  0.026  .058  1.621  1.586  .036  90.5 
March  ..  099  0.089  .060  1.560  1.563  -.004  92.8 
April  ..  107  0.115  .066  1.473  1.525  -.052  94.3 
May.  .  .112  0.088  .068  1.435  1.508  -.073  95.6 
June.  .  .114  0.069  .068  1.438  1.507  -.069  97.7 
July.  .  .  .  .  .118  0.143  .075  1.394  1.456  -.062  98.6 
August  .  .  .  .130  0.142  .083  1.378  1.410  -.032  99.7 
September  .  .139  0.173  .093  1.370  1.350  .020  100.0 
October.  .  .152  0.177  .104  1.400  1.293  .107  100.6 
November.  .173  0.289  .130  1.293  1.179  .114  100.7 
December  .204  0.303  .159  1.152  1.068  .084  100.0 
1923: 
January  .  252  0.419  .213  0.892  0.901  -.009  99.8 
February  .307  0.509  .290  0.605  0.712  -.107  98.5 
March  .  .346  0.311  .298  0.662  0.696  -.035  98.1 
April  .  322  0.095  .220  0.910  0.882  .028  98.4 
May.  .  .270  0.125  .192  0.984  0.962  .022  99.7 
June  .  268  0.297  .218  0.904  0.888  .016  100.9 
July .  .  320  0.497  .295  0.662  0.702  -.040  101.7 
August  .  .396  0.503  .371  0.487  0.551  -.064  102.4 
September  .  .428  0.385  .377  0.566  0.540  .026  102.9 
October.  .  .608  1.229  .836  -0.037  -0.081  .044  102.8 
November.  .738  0.802  .811  -0.048  -0.054  .006  102.6 
December  .764  0.983  .941  -0.168  -0.188  .020  102.4 
1924: 
January  .  .  .  .800  0.940  .940  -0.222  -0.188  -.034  100.5 
price of  food  for a working  family  was  used (Annuaire Statistique Hongrois, 
1919-22,  pp. 102, 193). The employment  index is based on numbers of unem- 
ployed  (International  Labour  Review,  September  1925,  pp.  347-48,  and 
Statistisches  Jahrbuch fur  das  Deutsche  Reich,  1926,  international  table  23), 
and  on  interpolated  population  figures  (UN  Demographic  Yearbook). The 
unemployment  percentage  is  assumed  to  be  6.5  percent  in  January  1924 
(International Labour Review, September  1925, p. 349),  and the  index  is cal- 
culated  by  the  method  described  above  for  Austria.  Values  in  parentheses 
have been obtained  by interpolation. 
4.  Poland:  M is an index of note circulation (Young  1925, p. 347). Figures 
have  been interpolated to the  middle of  the month  from end-of-month  data; 
P,  from  November  1921 to  October,  1923, is an index  of  the cost  of  living, 
apparently referring to the middle of the month (League of Nations,  Monthly 
Bulletin  of  Statistics,  1920-21,  vol.  2,  no.  12, p.  18, and  later  issues).  Pub- 
lished figures under this heading for months  prior to November  1921 actually 
refer to wholesale  prices. From November  1923 the data relates to the second 
half  of  the  month,  and  has  been  interpolated  to  the  middle  of  the  month 
(Monthly Bulletin,  1923, vol.  4, no.  11, p. 3).  Prior to  November  1921, retail 
price indices are apparently unavailable,  and an index of wholesale  prices has 
been used (International Labour Review, October 1921, p. 77). The employment INFLATION  AND DEMAND FOR MONEY  1263 
index is based on  numbers of  unemployed (Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur das 
Deutsche  Reich, 1924/25, international  table 13), and on interpolated  popula- 
tion figures (UN  Demographic Yearbook).  The percentage of  unemployed 
on September  1923 is assumed  to be 3 percent,  and the index is calculated  by 
the method described  above for Austria. 
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